
Kenya’s coalition democracy now faces a pressing challenge: did the recent changes within the Azimio coalition align with its governing framework, and was due process followed prior to regulatory acknowledgment?
As a citizen dedicated to upholding the rule of law, I feel compelled to scrutinize the actions of the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), which holds the vital responsibility of ensuring legality in party and coalition matters.
A letter from the ORPP, dated February 2, 2026 (Ref: RPP/FRP/101 (73)), has transformed what might have remained an internal coalition dispute into a significant national issue, fundamentally affecting the governance of political coalitions in Kenya.
By validating documents and providing administrative guidance regarding the alleged installation of new officials within Azimio’s leadership, the registrar seems to have proceeded under the assumption that the underlying process was lawful.
However, a thorough examination of the Azimio Deed of Agreement—the coalition’s paramount and legally binding document—raises substantial doubts about the validity of that assumption.
The Deed of Agreement is not a mere political formality; it serves as a registered contractual framework recognized under Kenyan law. Any actions taken outside its stipulations are not just irregular but fundamentally flawed. Curiously, the registrar’s own correspondence underscores procedural shortcomings that call into question the legitimacy of the purported changes.
The first issue pertains to notice. The ORPP acknowledges receipt of a notice dated January 29, 2026, convening a meeting on February 2, 2026. Article 8(5) of the Deed explicitly mandates a minimum notice period of seven days. A four-day notice is not a trivial oversight; it constitutes a significant breach of a clear contractual obligation. Consequently, any resolutions arising from such a meeting are, legally speaking, void from the outset.
The second issue revolves around authority. The submission of minutes and attendance lists cannot rectify a fundamental defect. Article 5 of the Deed comprehensively details the recognized organs of the coalition and does not allow for automatic reconstitution upon exit. Thus, the assembly that purportedly convened on February 2 appears to have lacked the necessary constitutional authority to make binding decisions on behalf of the coalition.
This concern is further exacerbated by a crucial substantive safeguard that appears to have been overlooked: the requirement for mutual agreement.
Article 19 of the Deed states unequivocally that any amendment to the coalition’s structure or governance requires the mutual agreement of all constituent parties, documented in writing and signed by each. This clause is specifically designed to prevent unilateral modifications or the capture of the coalition framework.
The stance of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), Azimio’s largest constituent party, is therefore pivotal. ODM has publicly and formally declared its lack of consent regarding the purported process, deeming it null and void. In situations where unanimity is contractually required, the refusal of even one party—especially the majority partner—renders the process invalid.
In this context, the registrar’s role extends beyond mere administration. The ORPP acts as a statutory gatekeeper, responsible for ensuring legality before offering regulatory guidance or proceeding with publication. Section 20 of the Political Parties Act presupposes that changes presented to the registrar are lawful. It does not empower the validation of contested or procedurally flawed actions.
Moving forward without addressing these defects risks conveying a troubling message: that registered deeds and constitutions hold little weight, internal safeguards can be disregarded, and compliance is a matter of paperwork rather than legality.
This moment demands institutional clarity and restraint from the ORPP. The issue at hand transcends political considerations; it is fundamentally legal. Will the ORPP uphold strict compliance with registered coalition agreements, or will it grant administrative validity to processes whose legality remains in question?
This matter extends beyond Azimio, representing a critical test for coalition governance and constitutionalism in Kenya. Based on the available records, the purported changes of February 2 appear legally untenable, arising from a flawed process and lacking unanimous consent.
